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PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL ACROSS
POLICYMAKING TOOLS
CATHERINE Y. KIM
ABSTRACT
Over the past quarter century, administrative law scholars have observed the President’s
growing control over agency policymaking and the separation-of-powers concerns implicated by
such unilateral exercises of power. The paradigmatic form of agency policymaking—notice-andcomment rulemaking—mitigates these concerns by ensuring considerable oversight by the courts,
Congress, and the public at large. Agencies, however, typically have at their disposal a variety of
policymaking tools with which to implement White House goals, including the issuance of guidance documents and the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion. While commentators have
drawn attention to the risk that agencies will circumvent the extensive checks associated with
rulemaking by issuing a guidance document instead, this Article argues that the potential for an
agency to forego both rulemaking and guidance documents in favor of the strategic exercise of
enforcement discretion poses a greater threat of unchecked unilateral power. It presents a case
study of the use of these different policymaking tools in the Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights (OCR), finding that while agencies are able to weaken external checks on presidential policy preferences by employing guidance documents instead of rulemaking, they can virtually eliminate such checks by implementing White House goals through the strategic exercise of
enforcement discretion. This Article closes by evaluating potential reforms to temper politically
motivated exercises of enforcement discretion, focusing not only on external mechanisms of oversight, but also on the role of the civil service bureaucracy within the agency itself.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past quarter century, administrative law scholars have
raised separation-of-powers concerns regarding the White House’s
steady expansion of control over agency policymaking, or “presidential administration.”1 Left unchecked, such exercises of unilateral
power challenge fundamental norms of administrative legitimacy,
including those resting on legislative supremacy, democratic accountability, and technocratic expertise.2 They may undermine ruleof-law values by permitting the President to develop policies contrary
to congressional will. They may compromise norms of democratic decision-making by potentially excluding public input from the development of policy. Finally, they may subordinate objective, expertdriven decision-making to the President’s raw political calculus.
Administrative law seeks to mitigate these concerns by empowering external institutions—including the courts, Congress, and the
public at large—to constrain presidential policymaking discretion.3
Courts exercise legal checks by scrutinizing agency decisions for fidelity to congressional goals and policing against arbitrary or biased
decision-making.4 Congress and the public also play important
1. Then-professor Elena Kagan famously coined the term “presidential administration” to describe the “recent and dramatic” transformation rendering “regulatory activity of
the executive branch agencies more and more an extension of the President’s own policy
and political agenda.” Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2246, 2248 (2001). Presidential control has since become the dominant model for understanding decision-making in the administrative state. See, e.g., David J. Barron, From
Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095 (2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside
the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 47 (2006); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision
Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers
to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling
Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
2. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461 (2003); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV.
441 (2010); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era
of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Mendelson, supra note 1; Gillian
E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 479 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An
Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016);
Watts, supra note 1.
3. See Metzger, supra note 2 (arguing that “ordinary” administrative law addresses
constitutional concerns, particularly those related to separation-of-powers).
4. Scholars have long emphasized the importance of such legal constraints, with
some suggesting that the very legitimacy of the administrative state hinges on the availability of judicial review. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REV.
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roles.5 Congress disciplines agency policymaking through funding
mechanisms, oversight hearings, and the threat of legislative reversal.6 Finally, the public disciplines agency policymaking by mobilizing political pressure on the agency, the White House, or Congress
to intervene.
Importantly, however, the operation of these checks varies considerably, depending on the particular policymaking tool employed by
the agency.7 Agencies may implement White House goals through a
variety of policymaking tools. The paradigmatic tool, notice-andcomment rulemaking, exposes presidential policies to extensive external oversight.8 Courts exercise both procedural and substantive
review over rulemaking decisions, ensuring that such policies comply
with legislative directives and are sufficiently rationalized. Congress
and the public likewise discipline agency rulemaking by exercising
political pressure.9
401, 401 (1958) (“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate,
or legally valid.”).
The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act were well aware of the importance of
these legal constraints, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 848 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (maintaining that the “sine qua non of the APA was to alter inherited judicial reluctance to constrain the exercise of discretionary administrative power—to rationalize and
make fairer the exercise of such discretion”), and consciously designed expansive provisions
for judicial review. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (originally
enacted as Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); § 551(13) (defining
“agency action” broadly to encompass “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”); § 706(1) (requiring
courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”).
5. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010) (arguing that politics, rather than law, provide the primary mechanism for constraining executive decision-making today).
6. Congress’s ability to reverse agency decisions is not absolute, however. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983) (reversing one-house
legislative veto).
7. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1383 (2004) (discussing breadth of policymaking forms available to agencies).
8. The vast majority of scholarship on presidential administration focuses on White
House control over this policymaking tool. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 2, at 449-56 (analyzing presidential control over agency rulemaking); Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 2, at
78-83 (discussing constraints on presidential control over agency refusals to engage in
rulemaking); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1131-46 (focusing on presidential influence over
rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1402 n.30 (2013) (justifying focus on rulemaking
as central mode of agency policymaking); Watts, supra note 1 (focusing on presidential
control over rulemaking while acknowledging that policies made through adjudication and
enforcement decisions sometimes overlap with rulemaking).
9. The extensiveness of constraints on rulemaking has generated widespread complaints of policy “ossification.” See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways
to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59 (1995); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystify-
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Alternatively, agencies may pursue the President’s agenda by issuing an informal guidance document simply announcing the new
policy in a memorandum, circular, bulletin, or manual, for example.10
Guidance documents are subject to weaker external constraints than
rulemaking, as they generally evade judicial review and attract less
legislative and public attention than rulemaking.
Finally, agencies may implement White House goals through the
strategic exercise of enforcement discretion, targeting particular issues for compliance investigation and aggressively negotiating settlements to require adherence to particular policy goals. Although
strategic exercises of discretion typically are accompanied by a guidance document directing street-level enforcement decisions, it is at
least conceivable that the President’s goals can be achieved through
this mechanism without being memorialized in a written directive. If
so, the resulting policy could potentially evade external oversight altogether. Compliance investigations rarely reach the formal agency
adjudication necessary for judicial review and may be undisclosed to
both Congress and the public.
Commentators have expressed much concern that agencies employ
guidance documents opportunistically to circumvent the more extensive checks imposed on rulemaking.11 The Supreme Court noted this
concern in its recent decision in Mortgage Bankers’ Ass’n v. Perez,
frankly acknowledging that “[t]here may be times when an agency’s
decision to issue an interpretive rule, rather than a legislative rule, is
driven primarily by a desire to skirt notice-and-comment provisions.”12 It is likely to revisit the issue again in the current Term,
having granted certiorari in Texas v. United States, in which the
Fifth Circuit rejected the administration’s attempt to characterize its
program granting relief to undocumented immigrants as a mere policy statement exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking require-

ing Deossification, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 483 (1997); Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification—A
Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453 (1995).
10. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines a “guidance document” as
an “agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory
action . . . that sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. NO. 07-02, FINAL BULLETIN FOR AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE
PRACTICES 6 (2007). It notes that such documents may describe an agency’s interpretation
of existing law or how it “will treat or enforce a governing legal norm.” Id. at 2.
11. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.
1311, 1312-19, 1318 n.23 (1992); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 420-33 (2007); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331
(2011).
12. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015).
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ments.13 These cases have drawn increased attention to the concern
that agencies abuse guidance documents to weaken external checks
on their discretion.
Yet few have examined the potential for agencies to circumvent
external checks altogether by pursuing presidential goals through
the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion in lieu of either rulemaking or guidance documents.14 The virtual absence of constraints
on exercises of enforcement discretion suggests that White House policies implemented through this tool pose an even greater threat of
unchecked power than the use of guidance documents.
This Article evaluates the extent to which agencies employ different policymaking tools to advance presidential goals, and the extent
to which such policymaking is subject to external oversight, through
a case study of policymaking in the Department of Education’s Office
for Civil Rights (OCR). With an annual budget of approximately $100
million15 and a staff of over 500 officials,16 OCR is responsible for enforcing federal prohibitions against discrimination across our nation’s
primary, secondary, and post-secondary schools.17 While the im13. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171-76 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 906 (2016) (mem.).
14. Although a number of scholars have begun examining the use of enforcement discretion as a policymaking tool, they have focused on instances in which such policies were
memorialized in a guidance document directing street-level officers on how their discretion
should be exercised. See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1031 (2013); Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and
Enforcing Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619 (2012); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg,
Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (2014); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014). The
administration’s policy of non-enforcement in the marijuana, Affordable Care Act, and
immigration contexts reflect this pattern.
15. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET
REQUEST 1 (2014) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, BUDGET REQUEST],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget14/justifications/bb-ocr.pdf.
16. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HELPING TO ENSURE EQUAL
ACCESS TO EDUCATION: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION FY
2009-12, at 3 (2012) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009-12],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/ocr/report-to-president-2009-12.pdf; OFFICE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS, ADVANCING EQUITY:
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF EDUCATION FY 13-14, at 8 (2015) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14], http://www2.ed.gov/
about/reports/annual/ocr/report-to-president-and-secretary-of-education-2013-14.pdf.
17. OCR enforces a number of statutory mandates. See Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (prohibiting sex discrimination by educational institutions); Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of age); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability); Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of race, color or national origin by recipients of federal financial assistance). In addition,
OCR possesses authority to enforce the Boy Scouts of American Equal Access Act of 2001
and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See Boy Scouts with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 20 U.S.C. § 7905 (2012) (mandating public schools to provide equal access to
school facilities); Title II of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
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portance of OCR’s mission renders this agency worthy of study in its
own right, it suggests broader lessons about constraints on presidential control across the administrative state. The case study confirms
that agencies regularly implement White House goals through guidance documents, thereby avoiding the more robust constraints on
rulemaking; crucially, however, it also suggests that agencies implement presidential policy preferences through the strategic exercise of
enforcement discretion and, in doing so, evade even the modest
checks associated with guidance documents. This evidence suggests
that proposals to limit an agency’s ability to weaken external checks
on presidential policies by relying on guidance documents may be
counterproductive, as the agency could simply respond by channeling
policymaking through the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion, potentially eliminating such oversight altogether.
Part I explores mechanisms of presidential control over different forms of agency policymaking and the incentives for politically
motivated agencies to employ certain forms opportunistically to minimize external constraints. It then sets forth the contours of the empirical debate over the extent to which agencies engage in such opportunism. Part II assesses this empirical question, presenting a case
study of policymaking in the Office for Civil Rights. It detects significant policy shifts in OCR’s exercise of enforcement discretion, shifts
that have evaded meaningful external oversight. Part III explores
potential reforms to temper politically motivated exercises of enforcement discretion. It concludes that prospects for strengthening
external oversight are limited, counseling in favor of a turn inward to
empower the civil service bureaucracy within the agency itself.18

(2012) (prohibiting discrimination the basis of disability by any public entity, regardless of
receipt of federal funds).
18. A growing body of literature on “internal separation of powers” explores the potential for institutional design reforms focusing on agency structures and processes to discipline agency policymaking. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113
HARV. L. REV. 633, 688-89 (2000) (proposing bureaucratic reforms to enhance functional
specialization and cabin politicization of agencies); Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts
and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359 (2013) (examining
effects of institutional design on executive branch legal decision-making); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (outlining structural mechanisms to cabin executive
branch policymaking discretion); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power
Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011) (exploring the impact of agency structure
and design on substantive decision-making); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to
Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009) [hereinafter Metzger, Interdependent Relationship]; Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 211 (2015) (examining the impact of interagency structures on executive branch
policymaking).
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II. CONSTRAINTS ON PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
Agencies typically possess at their disposal a variety of policymaking tools, including rulemaking, the issuance of guidance documents,
and the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion.19 First, agencies
may engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking to produce legally
binding “legislative rules.”20 Second, they may issue a “guidance document,” defined by the Office of Management and Budget as “an
agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other
than a regulatory action . . . that sets forth a policy on a statutory,
regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or
regulatory issue.”21 These documents appear in a variety of formats,
including memoranda, circulars, bulletins, and manuals,22 and are
exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements.23 A third
policymaking tool frequently available to agencies is the strategic
exercise of enforcement discretion. Decisions regarding which cases
to investigate and how to resolve them provide a powerful tool to
shape behavior and achieve policy goals. This policymaking tool often
overlaps with the second policymaking tool, for example when a
guidance document instructs officials how they should exercise their
discretion in individual cases. It is at least conceivable, however, that
individual enforcement decisions reflect larger policy goals even
without being memorialized in a guidance document.
The precise mechanisms of presidential influence over each of
these policymaking tools differ, and mechanisms of external oversight of such presidential influence likewise vary based on the policymaking tool employed. This variability creates incentives for agencies to employ certain tools opportunistically to minimize checks on
their discretion, although practical and doctrinal considerations may
counterbalance these incentives. Consequently, the extent to which
agencies engage in such opportunistic behavior remains an open empirical question.
19. Congress sometimes limits the policymaking tools available to an agency. For
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 vested the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with the authority to investigate complaints alleging employment discrimination but denied it the authority to develop substantive regulations interpreting the statute or to initiate judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 252 (1964). The EEOC’s powers have since been amended. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-12, 123 Stat. 5.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203
(2015) (noting that rules promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking are
entitled to binding force of law).
21. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10,
at 6.
22. Id. at 2.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (exempting “interpretive guidance” and “general statements of policy” from notice-and-comment requirements).
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A. Mechanisms of Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools
Few today contest that agency policymaking is subject to an unprecedented degree of control by the President. The precise mechanisms of such control may vary, however, depending on which policymaking tool is employed.
The mechanisms of presidential influence over agency rulemaking
have been well documented.24 First, the appointment power allows
the White House to install ideological allies in the agency leadership
positions to which rulemaking authority is delegated.25 Second, the
emergence of centralized regulatory review has facilitated presidential control over rulemaking. Since the 1970s, presidents have issued
a series of Executive Orders requiring agencies to submit all “significant” rulemaking proposals for pre-clearance by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB).26 While OIRA does not claim
formal authority to reject proposals, the White House routinely negotiates changes and may quash proposals by delaying approval indefinitely.27 These two developments—the expansion of political
24. See sources cited supra note 8.
25. See Barron, supra note 1, at 1121-33 (discussing increased politicization of administrative agencies due to growing number of presidential appointments and aggressive
White House screening of candidates); see also DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE
(2008). The Constitution provides little guidance for the appointment of administrative
officials, stating only that:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It does not define “non-inferior” officers, nor does it specify
appointment procedures for administrative officials below non-inferior officers.
26. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R.
191 (2008), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010); Exec. Order 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-30 (1982), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 649; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-19, LEGISLATIVE COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE (1972),
revised Sept. 20, 1979.
27. Professor Mendelson’s empirical study shows that OIRA under President Clinton
allowed fewer than forty percent of proposed regulations to proceed without change, while
the Bush Administration permitted only seventeen percent of such proposals to proceed
unaltered. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1150. Of course, the President does not personally
scrutinize every policy proposal subject to regulatory review. As Professors Bressman and
Vandenbergh note, “[p]residential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it,’ ” as various White House
offices work in conjunction with OIRA to influence agencies’ policy development.
Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 49-50. Even with this limitation, however, the
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appointments and the emergence of centralized policy review—
ensure that agency rulemaking conforms to the White House’s political agenda.
These two mechanisms similarly enhance the President’s influence over agency guidance documents. Unlike rulemaking decisions,
which typically are made by an agency’s presidentially appointed
leader, guidance documents frequently are issued by lower-level officials. Nonetheless, the steady expansion of the President’s appointment power increases the likelihood that these lower-level officials
have been screened for allegiance to White House policy preferences.28 The number and percentage of presidentially appointed
agency positions has nearly doubled over the past fifty years, and the
vast majority of these positions serve at the pleasure of the President
with no protections from removal.29 Moreover, Congress has eliminated civil service protections for large segments of the bureaucracy,
rendering a growing number of agency officials vulnerable to removal
on ideological grounds rather than for cause.30 As then-Professor
David Barron observed, “Agencies are now staffed in ways that make
them increasingly likely to speak the White House line as if it
were their own, even if they have not been ordered to do so by the
President.”31 Moreover, the Bush and Obama administrations have
process of regulatory review undoubtedly provides the White House with a powerful tool to
shape agency policymaking.
28. Notwithstanding social science literature characterizing the relationship between
Congress and the President as one of competition over agency control, see JAMES Q.
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989);
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et
al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989), Congress has tended to exercise its discretion to expand the President’s
appointment power. Even more puzzling, Congress has limited its own ability to check the
President’s choice of appointee, expanding the number of administrative positions appointed by the President without Senate approval. See, e.g., Presidential Appointment Efficiency
and Streamlining Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-166, 126 Stat. 1283 (codified in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
29. DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 70, 82-83 (2012). To be sure, the
power to appoint and remove does not grant the President unfettered control over the officials serving under him. As Professor Peter Strauss notes, while the Constitution undoubtedly confers on the President the power to exercise oversight over his appointee, it does not
grant him the right to legally compel the appointee to take a particular action. Peter L.
Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007). If the President is unable to persuade the appointee to adopt his
preferred position, the only recourse available is removing the officer, which incurs
political costs.
30. See LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 29, at 72-81 (describing growth of federal employment exempted from Title 5 civil service protections).
31. Barron, supra note 1, at 1121.
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extended centralized regulatory review to “significant guidance documents,” enabling the White House to influence the use of this tool
just as it influences rulemaking, providing a mechanism for the
White House to stymie disfavored policies.32
The mechanisms of presidential control over agency exercises of
enforcement discretion in the absence of a guidance document are
less apparent. Unlike both rulemaking and guidance documents, individual enforcement decisions typically are made, at least in the
first instance, by street-level civil service bureaucrats insulated from
political influence.33 Additionally, the system of centralized OIRA review does not apply to individual enforcement decisions.
Notwithstanding these limitations, one can readily imagine means
by which an agency’s political leadership controls enforcement decisions. It might influence those decisions ex ante by instructing lowerlevel officers on how they should exercise their enforcement discretion orally or through some other means than a guidance document.
Political operatives within the agency also may control those decisions ex post by requiring their personal approval for each and every
enforcement decision. Moreover, even where agency appointees lack
the capacity to review all decisions, they could identify a subset of
cases of particular interest for review. In fact, agency leadership
might be able to shape the tone and culture of the agency so effectively as to influence staff behavior without any explicit commands or
personal review at all. While career officers may not be formally
bound by the implicit policy preferences of the political leadership,
the desire to routinize decisions and avoid conflict with organizational superiors may be sufficient to achieve compliance.34
B. External Oversight Across Policymaking Tools
Just as the mechanisms of presidential control differ across agency policymaking tools, the strength of external constraints to presidential power varies across policymaking tools.

32. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497,3
C.F.R. 218 (2010); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 10; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEM. No. 0913, GUIDANCE FOR REGULATORY REVIEW (2009).
33. See LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 29, at 66.
34. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 11, at 1363 (discussing the need for a more nuanced
assessment of the relationship between the political appointees at agency headquarters
and civil service staff in field offices).
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1. Checks on Rulemaking
Rulemaking presents the most salient and publicly accessible form
of agency policymaking, ensuring robust external constraints on
White House preferences and affording the broadest protections
against unilateral decision-making.
The judiciary imposes strong legal constraints on presidential control over rulemaking by requiring agencies to provide a contemporaneous, reasoned justification35 and exercising “hard-look review”36
over rulemaking decisions. In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,37 the Supreme Court was even willing to closely scrutinize an agency’s decision not to engage in rulemaking, ultimately
rejecting what was widely viewed as a presidentially directed decision not to regulate greenhouse gases.38
Congress and the public at large also play important roles in disciplining agency rulemaking, paying considerable attention to their
proposals and passage.39 Specifically, the APA’s procedural requirements—which mandate that agencies provide the public with the
“opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments,” take these public comments into
consideration, and publicly explain its reasons for ultimately adopting the policy40—empower the public to exercise significant checks
on such decisions. Taken together, these mechanisms ensure that

35. See SEC. v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87, 95 (1943); Kevin M. Stack,
The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958 (2007) (noting that
Chenery I “operates both to bolster the political accountability of the agency’s action and to
prevent arbitrariness in the agency’s exercise of discretion”).
36. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983); see Metzger, supra note 2, at 491 (describing hard-look review announced in State
Farm as a judicial effort to mitigate the “risk of unaccountable and arbitrary exercises of
administrative power”).
37. 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007).
38. Id. at 533-35; see Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 83-87 (discussing strictness of review applied in Massachusetts v. EPA); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference
and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 799-803 (2007) (same).
39. For discussions of congressional control over agency rulemaking decisions, see
MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND
ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE (2008); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 68 (2006); Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727, 740, 742
(2009); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 471, 485-86 (2011). Congress has also created an expedited legislative process to
review agency rules before they take effect. See Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104121, §§ 251-253, 110 Stat. 868 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012)) (enacting procedures for congressional review of agency rulemaking).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). The process of OIRA regulatory review exposes rulemaking to
further public scrutiny, requiring public disclosure of cost-benefit analyses for all significant rules. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
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presidentially directed rulemaking decisions are subject to political
accountability, consistent with congressional intent, and not biased
or arbitrary.
2. Checks on Guidance Documents
Presidential policies announced through the issuance of guidance
documents are subject to comparatively weaker external constraints.
Although guidance documents theoretically are subject to closer judicial scrutiny than rulemaking,41 ripeness and finality doctrines typically preclude any judicial review at all. In National Park Hospitality
Ass’n v. Department of the Interior,42 the Supreme Court held that an
agency’s general statement of policy is not ripe for judicial review
where:
[It] does not create adverse effects of a strictly legal kind, . . . does
not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing anything; . . . does not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; . . . does not subject anyone to any civil
or criminal liability; and . . . creates no legal rights or
obligations.43

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explains, “In
terms of reviewability, legislative rules and sometimes even interpretive rules may be subject to pre-enforcement judicial review, but general statements of policy are not.”44
Guidance documents also are subject to less congressional and
public oversight than rulemaking. Because they are exempted from
APA notice-and-comment requirements,45 guidance documents need
not be subject to public comment or even publicly disclosed. It is
worth noting that since 2007, the White House has imposed upon itself an obligation to publicly disclose “significant guidance documents.”46 This obligation, however, lacks any enforcement mechanism and may be rescinded at any time. Even when publicly disclosed, guidance documents typically attract less congressional and
public attention than rulemaking, thereby limiting mechanisms of
political accountability.
41. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 254 (2001) (stating that “policy
statements, agency manuals, and . . . enforcement guidelines” lie “beyond the Chevron
pale” and instead are subject to the less deferential standard set forth in Skidmore (first
citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); then citing
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944))).
42. 538 U.S. 803 (2003).
43. Id. at 809 (alterations omitted) (citations omitted).
44. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
46. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10,
at 21.
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3. Checks on Strategic Exercises of Enforcement Discretion
Among the policymaking tools available to agencies, the strategic
exercise of enforcement discretion is subject to the weakest external
constraints. Courts play a minimal role in disciplining such policies
because enforcement decisions do not constitute “final agency action”
subject to judicial review under the APA47 unless and until the agency completes its investigation, files an administrative complaint, and
enters a formal adjudicative finding of noncompliance.48 The vast majority of agency enforcement decisions never reach a formal finding of
noncompliance susceptible to judicial review.49
Perhaps more importantly, an agency’s decision not to initiate enforcement proceedings generally is insulated from any review at all.
In Heckler v. Chaney, death row inmates sued the Federal Drug Administration for failing to prevent state prisons from using certain
drugs in lethal injections in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.50 Rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court held that
an agency’s refusal to initiate investigative or enforcement proceedings is a decision “committed to agency discretion” and thus presumptively immune from judicial review.51 Heckler provided, however, that the presumption of non-reviewability might be reversed in
certain narrow circumstances.52
47. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
48. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239-41 (1980)
(concluding initiation of administrative adjudication proceedings does not constitute “final
agency action” subject to review); Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that agency investigation and request for voluntary corrective action does not constitute “final agency action”
subject to judicial review).
49. See Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation
on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1368-69 (2000) (noting that the “huge majority of administrative enforcement proceedings settle; in these cases, there is no formal
hearing and no possibility of judicial review”) (footnote omitted).
50. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
51. Id. at 838 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). The Court set forth three rationales for
rejecting judicial review over agency “[r]efusals to take enforcement steps.” Id. at 831.
First, it reasoned that enforcement decisions require a “complicated balancing of a number
of factors which are peculiarly within [an agency’s] expertise,” including an assessment of
“whether a violation [actually] occurred,” the likelihood of success of an enforcement action,
the overall resources available to an agency, as well as the “agency’s overall policies.” Id.
Second, it contended “when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon
areas that courts often are called upon to protect.” Id. at 832. Third, it relied on a “tradition” of judicial deference over enforcement decisions, analogizing them to absolute prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context. Id.
52. Id. at 832-33, 833 n.4 (allowing that presumption might be rebutted where Congress establishes “substantive priorities, or . . . circumscrib[es] an agency’s power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue” or where an agency “ ‘consciously and expressly adopt[s] a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its
statutory responsibilit[y]” (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir.
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Political constraints to agency exercises of enforcement discretion
are similarly weak.53 Neither Congress nor the public at large can
discipline enforcement decisions unless they are made aware of them.
Strategic exercises of enforcement discretion, however, may not be
exposed unless accompanied by a guidance document. While Congress sometimes requires agencies to report their enforcement efforts, it generally does not mandate any particular level of specificity.
As a result, statutory reporting requirements may fail to expose
shifts in enforcement policy, precluding both Congress and the public
from assessing existing enforcement policies, identifying gaps in enforcement, or exercising political pressure to shift priorities.
Here, too, the White House has directed agencies to make enforcement data publicly available.54 Again, however, this commitment
lacks any enforcement mechanism and is subject to rescission, enabling presidential policies pursued through enforcement discretion to
evade meaningful external constraint.
C. Circumvention Incentives
The variability of external oversight across policymaking tools
would appear to create incentives for politically motivated agencies to
employ certain tools opportunistically to minimize constraints on executive discretion. Practical and doctrinal considerations, however,
may counterbalance the incentives to evade more rigorous constraints,55 leaving the extent to which agencies actually engage in
such opportunistic behavior a subject of debate.
Current doctrine generally grants an agency the freedom to choose
any policymaking tool in its arsenal to effectuate a given policy. Pursuant to SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), courts will not exercise
judicial review over an agency’s decision to promulgate a new policy
through an enforcement proceeding rather than rulemaking.56 By
1973))). See generally Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461 (2008) (proposing a theoretical
framework for understanding judicial review over agency inaction).
53. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 286-87 (2003) (noting that retail enforcement typically flies under
public radar); see also Andrias, supra note 14, at 1063, 1083-90 (discussing absence of
transparency in enforcement priority shifts).
54. Memorandum on Regulatory Compliance, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 1
(Jan. 18, 2011), reprinted in 76 Fed. Reg. 3825, 3825 (Jan. 21, 2011) (explaining that
“[g]reater disclosure of regulatory compliance information fosters fair and consistent enforcement . . . [and] is a critical step in encouraging the public to hold the Government and
regulated entities accountable . . . provid[ing] Americans with information they need to
make informed decisions”).
55. See infra Sections II.D.1, II.D.2.
56. 332 U.S. 194, 203, 207 (1947); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron
Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974).
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contrast, an agency decision to announce a new policy through a
guidance document rather than rulemaking is subject to judicial review,57 but even here the considerable doctrinal confusion over the
distinction between these policymaking forms grants agencies wide
latitude to choose between the two.58 An agency seeking to implement
a presidential policy preference thus may choose to do so by engaging
in rulemaking, issuing a guidance document, or exercising its enforcement discretion, and courts generally do not second-guess
that choice.
A number of commentators have expressed concern that agencies
will exercise this choice to circumvent the more onerous constraints
associated with rulemaking, focusing in particular on the use of
guidance documents. Observing “widespread” abuse in this area,
former Chair of the Administrative Conference of the United States
Robert Anthony states:
Where an agency can nonlegislatively impose standards and obligations that as a practical matter are mandatory, it eases its
work greatly in several undesirable ways. It escapes the delay and
the challenge of allowing public participation in the development
of its rule. It probably escapes the toil and the discipline of building a strong rulemaking record. It escapes the discipline of preparing a statement of the basis and purpose justifying the rule. It may
also escape APA publication requirements and Office of Management and Budget regulatory review. And if the agency can show
that its informal document is not final or ripe, it will escape immediate judicial review. Indeed, for practical reasons it may escape
judicial review altogether.59

Professor Mark Seidenfeld likewise suggests that agencies “exploit” policy statements to implement policies that likely would “succumb to political or legal opposition were [they] adopted using noticeand-comment procedures.”60 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Mortgage Bankers Association v. Perez frankly acknowledges this

57. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *19 (5th Cir.
Nov. 9, 2015) (finding substantial likelihood of success on merits of argument that Obama
administration policy granting deferred action to undocumented immigrants does not constitute policy statement exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements because it “imposes rights and obligations” and does not leave room for agency discretion);
General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 382, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that agency may
not issue informal Guidance Document to promulgate policy with “binding effect” but must
instead undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking).
58. See Anthony, supra note 11, at 1359; Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 334-35.
59. Anthony, supra note 11, at 1317-18 (footnotes omitted); see also Mendelson, supra
note 11, at 408 (“[B]y issuing a guidance document, an agency can obtain a rule-like effect
while minimizing political oversight and avoiding the procedural discipline, public participation, and judicial accountability required by the APA.”).
60. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 343.
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risk: “There may be times when an agency’s decision to issue an interpretive rule, rather than a legislative rule, is driven primarily by a
desire to skirt notice-and-comment provisions.”61
Although most of the commentary in this area focuses on the use
of guidance documents, it would appear that agency exercises of enforcement discretion present the greater risk of circumvention, as
this policymaking tool potentially evades any external oversight. As
long as an enforcement decision does not result in final adjudication,
and most do not, it is unlikely to be scrutinized by the courts, Congress, or the general public. While the use of policy guidance may
weaken external constraints, the exercise of enforcement discretion
potentially eliminates them altogether.
A number of practical and doctrinal considerations, however, arguably counterbalance an agency’s motivation to exercise its choice of
policymaking tool in a manner that evades more rigorous oversight
mechanisms.
1. Practical Factors
A number of practical factors may limit the extent to which presidential goals are achieved through exercises of enforcement
discretion.
As suggested above, political operatives may lack the capacity to
influence individual enforcement decisions. Individual enforcement
decisions typically are made by street-level bureaucrats who are protected by civil service laws designed to insulate them from political
manipulation.62 Without a guidance document, an agency’s political
leadership may be unable to communicate a policy on how those decisions should be made. Nor is it clear that agency leadership can control enforcement decisions by exercising ex post review over them,
given the sheer volume of enforcement decisions.63 In fact, Professor
Strauss has suggested that lower-level bureaucrats channel policymaking through enforcement proceedings precisely to avoid political
supervision.64
61. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); see also Texas v. United
States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015) (rejecting Obama administration’s use of guidance document rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking to implement deferred action policy).
62. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1482
(1992) (“The usual interface between a member of the public and an agency does not involve the agency head, but a relatively low-level member of staff[.]”).
63. See Andrias, supra note 14, at 1071 (noting that time and resource limitations
preclude systemic political review over all significant enforcement decisions).
64. Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive
Department: Reflections on the Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1253-54 (1974).
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Yet one can readily imagine that in at least some cases, an agency’s political leadership is able to communicate policy preferences to
street-level enforcement officers without a guidance document; it
might issue a policy directive orally, for example.65 Moreover, it
might exercise ex post control notwithstanding time and resource
limitations by limiting its review to certain types of cases. It is worth
noting in this respect that at least one study finds that exercises of
agency enforcement discretion have been more susceptible to presidential influence than guidance documents.66
Even if political operatives have the capacity to influence individual enforcement decisions without guidance documents, commentators argue that other practical considerations, nonetheless, encourage
them to use guidance documents to announce the policies pursued
through exercises of enforcement discretion.67 Among these, the desire to claim political credit for a policy decision may motivate such
disclosure. Additionally, disclosure allows regulated entities to comply before an investigation is initiated, thereby conserving agency
resources, protecting against due process objections, and promoting
positive relationships with regulated entities.68
Whether these considerations ultimately lead to public disclosure
of enforcement decisions is unclear. The desire to allow regulated entities to conform prior to the initiation of an enforcement action encourages an agency to disclose new policies to regulated entities, but
provides no incentives to disclose to regulatory beneficiaries or the
general public. This informational asymmetry favors deregulatory
initiatives because only regulated entities will mobilize political pressure to challenge policy choices. Moreover, although agencies may be
motivated to publicly disclose an enforcement policy in order to claim
political credit for it, this dynamic may not apply to all enforcement
policies. For a politically motivated policy made for the benefit of a
small minority or faction, incentives for public disclosure disappear
entirely. These are the very cases, of course, where the need for public disclosure is greatest.

65. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1076 (“[T]he structure of adjudication allows
adjudicators to operate fairly independently on matters that are within their purview, thus
allocating authority down within the agency. But senior agency policymakers retain a fair
amount of freedom to craft rules that remove matters from the purview of case-by-case
adjudication.”).
66. Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 415-17 (2010) (conducting
empirical study of decisionmaking by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
67. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 435-36 (contending that risk of “secret law” or
nondisclosure of agency policies is overstated).
68. Id.
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These competing practical considerations render the extent to
which agencies rely on individual exercises of enforcement discretion
to implement presidential policy goals an open question.
2. Doctrinal Factors
In addition to the practical considerations that might impede an
agency’s capacity or willingness to exercise its enforcement discretion
in pursuit of presidential policy goals, commentators have identified
doctrinal considerations that might counterbalance the agency’s incentives to circumvent constraints in this manner.69 They argue that
because only formalized decisions—such as those made pursuant to
rulemaking and formal agency adjudication—are entitled to the
“binding force of law”70 and Chevron deference,71 agencies will be inclined to engage in these forms of policymaking notwithstanding the
costs associated with them. That is, while an agency might be tempted to rely on policy guidance or exercises of enforcement discretion to
avoid the rigorous constraints on rulemaking, it might nonetheless
submit to those constraints in order to legally bind regulated entities
and obtain a more deferential standard of judicial review. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in the Mortgage Bankers case articulates this view.
While acknowledging that non-formalized policies are comparatively
easier to promulgate than rulemaking, she concludes “that convenience comes at a price: Interpretive rules ‘do not have the force and
effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory
process.’ ”72 In these ways, a number of commentators argue that concerns regarding administrative evasion of rulemaking protections
are overblown.
Others, however, suggest that neither the binding force of law
nor a more deferential standard of review may suffice to outweigh
the incentives to evade external oversight. An agency that is able
to obtain voluntary compliance with its policy preferences has little
69. Magill, supra note 7, at 1423; see also Raso, supra note 8 (evaluating empirical
evidence suggesting agencies do not channel policies through policy guidance to evade constraints on discretion).
70. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (“It is fair to assume
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”); see also Kristin E.
Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 511-13 (2013).
71. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 221, 234; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944); Magill, supra note 7, at 1441 (“The Mead decision has been, and should be, read to
force the agency to give something up—namely, Chevron deference—if it chooses to announce its interpretation of a statute or regulation through a guidance document.”).
72. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (citation omitted)
(reversing D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which required agencies to undergo
rulemaking in order to change its interpretation of its own regulation).
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need to legally bind regulated entities. 73 It also benefits little from
deferential judicial review unless it is likely to be challenged in
litigation.74
In these ways, existing scholarly accounts dispute the extent to
which agencies rely on enforcement discretion to promote presidential policy goals.
***
Agencies seeking to implement a presidential policy goal possess a
range of policymaking tools at their disposal—including rulemaking,
the issuance of guidance documents, and the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion—each of which is subject to varying degrees of
external oversight. This variability creates incentives for an agency
to advance policy goals—especially controversial ones—through particular policymaking tools to evade stronger checks on its discretion.
While commentators have identified factors that might counterbalance these incentives, the extent to which agencies actually engage in
such opportunistic behavior remains an open empirical question. The
next Part engages in this empirical inquiry, presenting a case study
of the use of different policymaking tools at one agency—the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights.
III. CASE STUDY OF THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
This Part presents a case study of policymaking in the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR). After introducing
some of the more salient characteristics of this agency, it examines
OCR’s use of different policymaking tools to pursue White House
goals. The study finds that OCR rarely pursues the President’s agenda through rulemaking, frequently relying instead on guidance documents. More alarmingly, it suggests significant political influence
over the agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion, generating policies that have evaded meaningful external oversight. This Part closes
by considering the generalizability of these findings.
73. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 407 (noting that regulated entities may prefer to
comply with a non-mandatory policy where the cost of compliance is low but the sanctions
for noncompliance are high or where they need to maintain a long-term relationship with
the agency); see also Anthony, supra note 11, at 1327-30 (noting that many policies lacking
legally binding effect have practically binding effect).
74. See Anthony, supra note 11, at 1316-17 (noting unlikelihood of legal challenge to
agency policy where “the affected private parties cannot afford the cost or the delay of litigation, or because for other practical reasons they must accept a needed agency approval or
benefit on whatever terms the agency sets”); see also Mendelson, supra note 11, at 411-13,
420-24; Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 364-72. Additionally, empirical evidence suggests that
the imposition of Skidmore standard of review rather than the more deferential Chevron
standard has negligible results on the outcome of cases. See William N. Eskridge & Lauren
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2008).
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A. Overview of the Office for Civil Rights
The Office for Civil Rights (OCR)75 initially was created to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting recipients of
federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of race,
color or national origin.76 Today, it is situated within the Department
of Education77 and maintains primary responsibility for enforcing
federal protections against discrimination—on the basis of not only
race, ethnicity and national origin, but also sex and disability—
across our nation’s primary, secondary, and post-secondary schools.78
With an annual operating budget of approximately $100 million and
over 500 staff members across twelve regional offices,79 the importance, breadth, and depth of OCR operations render this agency
worthy of study in its own right.
At the same time, the case study of OCR suggests broader lessons
concerning presidential control over the administrative state more
generally. First, like many agencies, OCR maintains an array of policymaking tools at its disposal. It engages in notice-and-comment
rulemaking80 and issues guidance documents.81 It also possesses
statutory authority to conduct administrative enforcement proceedings.82 The breadth of policymaking tools available to OCR enables a
comparative analysis of presidential influence across tools.
Second, aspects of OCR’s institutional design are representative of
a great number of agencies across the administrative state. Unlike
independent agencies or those led by multi-member commissions,
which are specifically designed to be insulated from presidential influence, OCR’s structure and composition adhere to the traditional
model of federal administrative agencies. Firmly ensconced within
the President’s executive branch hierarchy, OCR is located within
75. 32 Fed. Reg. 15,190, 15,190 (Nov. 7, 1967) (establishing Office for Civil Rights
within Department of Health, Education and Welfare, predecessor to the Department of
Education).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252
(1964)).
77. In 1979, Congress reorganized the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
to create a separate cabinet department for education. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668, 671 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (2012)).
78. See provisions of the U.S. Code cited supra note 17 and accompanying text (listing
statutes enforced by OCR).
79. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16, at 8;
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 15, at 1.
80. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (delegating authority to “issu[e] rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability”).
81. See Magill, supra note 7, at 1390 & n.14 (describing inherent agency authority to
issue policy guidance (first citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); then citing
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 6.4 at 325 (Aspen, 4th ed. 2002))).
82. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (delegating authority to conduct enforcement proceedings to terminate federal funds for noncompliance).
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the Department of Education, requiring OCR leadership to report
to a higher level within the executive branch: the Secretary for
Education.
Moreover, OCR leadership is subject to White House appointment.
The Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights is nominated by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and enjoys no protections from removal.83 The White House has exercised this appointment power to install ideological allies to lead the agency. For example, President Clinton appointed Norma Cantu to the position, who
had litigated school desegregation and funding inequities with the
Mexican American Legal Defense Fund,84 while President Obama
appointed Catherine Lhamon, who had litigated the landmark Williams v. California case challenging unequal access to school resources while at the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California.85 President W. Bush, by contrast, appointed Gerald Reynolds,
whose work with the Center for New Black Leadership and Center
for Equal Opportunity made his opposition to race-conscious diversity
policies and the disparate impact theory of liability well known.86
At the same time, OCR’s large cadre of professional staff and attorneys, like most federal agency officials below the politically appointed leadership, are insulated from partisan pressures through
civil service rules protecting them from being hired, fired, or punished on the basis of ideology or political affiliation.87 Staff at each of
the twelve regional OCR enforcement offices enjoy such protections,

83. 20 U.S.C. § 3412(b)(2) (2012). A series of senior agency positions serving below the
Assistant Secretary at D.C. headquarters—eleven in total—likewise are subject to political
appointment. The U.S. Government Printing Office publishes the “Plum Book” every four
years, listing all administrative positions within the executive and legislative branches
subject to political appointment. It explains, “The duties of many such positions may involve advocacy of Administration policies and programs and the incumbents usually have a
close and confidential working relationship with the agency head or other key officials.” H.
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 112TH CONG., POLICY AND SUPPORTING
POSITIONS iii (Comm. Print 2012).
84. 139 CONG. REC. 10,351 (1993) (recording appointment of Norma V. Cantu).
85. 159 CONG. REC. S6261, S6263 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2013) (confirming the nomination
of Catherine Lhamon).
86. Nomination of Gerald A. Reynolds, of Missouri, to be Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights: Hearing Before Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 1
(2002); see also Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the Role of the Federal
Government, 88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 749 & n.152, 751 n.170 (2010) (discussing opposition by
the civil rights community to nomination and eventual recess appointment of Reynolds).
For three of the eight years of the W. Bush administration, no Assistant Secretary was
appointed, leaving the agency without leadership.
87. 20 U.S.C. § 3413(c) (authorizing the Assistant Secretary to “select, appoint, and
employ such officers and employees, including staff attorneys, as may be necessary to carry
out the functions of the Office” but providing that they be subject to civil service protections
of Title 5 governing appointments in competitive service, chapter 51, and subchapter III of
chapter 53 relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates).
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and there are no political appointees in these offices. In these ways,
the central aspects of OCR’s leadership and staffing structure are
representative of most federal agencies across the administrative state.
Finally, OCR’s substantive charge—civil rights enforcement—
presents a particularly contentious issue politically. Accusations of
presidential subversion of civil rights mandates are nearly as old as
the civil rights statutes themselves. Leon Panetta, former head of
OCR, claimed the Nixon administration dismissed him from this position for rigorously enforcing federal civil rights laws in contravention of the President’s political agenda.88 The Reagan administration
similarly fell under critical fire for focusing exclusively on claims of
intentional discrimination and rejecting more structural or systematic reforms.89 More recently, a series of reports accused the George W.
Bush administration of manipulating civil rights enforcement for
partisan ends.90 Targeting presidential interference with OCR in particular, Professor Lia Epperson argues that this “federal administrative agency historically tasked with protecting civil rights, effectively
subverted its enforcement power to help eliminate the very policies
and programs that sought to achieve racial inclusion in public education.”91 While the political salience of civil rights enforcement may
distinguish OCR from agencies charged with enforcing less contentious areas of the law, this salience ensures consistent White House
involvement, thereby providing a valuable opportunity to evaluate

88. See LEON E. PANETTA & PETER GALL, BRING US TOGETHER: THE NIXON TEAM AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS RETREAT 357 (1971) (recounting President Nixon’s hostility to civil rights

enforcement and consequent removal of Panetta as the head of OCR).
89. See Drew S. Days, III, The Courts’ Response to the Reagan Civil Rights Agenda, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1008-13 (1989) (describing presidential civil rights agenda under
Reagan administration); see also Le, supra note 86, at 742-44 (describing critiques of civil
rights enforcement under Reagan administration); Lemos, supra note 66, at 404-17 (same).
90. See Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil Rights Enforcement
Within the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 139-68 (2007);
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: INFORMATION ON
EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, HOUSING AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT, VOTING, AND SPECIAL
LITIGATION SECTIONS’ ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FROM FISCAL YEARS 2001 THROUGH 2007
(2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1075.pdf; see also CITIZENS’ COMM’N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE EROSION OF RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007); Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 77,
85 (2009) (criticizing DOJ under the W. Bush administration for “a worrisome erosion of
institutional norms of impartiality, professionalism, and nonpartisanship in civil rights
enforcement” and “a broader pattern of undue and, in some cases, unlawful political influence in civil rights matters”).
91. Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the Executive Branch in
Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146, 166 (2008).
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the external constraints on such influence. For these reasons, the
case study of OCR offers important lessons for the larger administrative state.
B. OCR’s Use of Different Policymaking Tools
A comparative analysis of OCR’s use of different policymaking
tools supports the scholarly concern that agencies channel controversial presidential goals through guidance documents rather than
rulemaking. It further suggests, however, that OCR implements significant policy shifts through the exercise of enforcement discretion.
1. Rulemaking
OCR’s use of rulemaking to implement presidential goals has been
exceedingly rare. In the past twenty-five years, the agency has promulgated new regulations to advance a presidential agenda only once.92
In 2006, OCR under the Bush administration published final rules
interpreting Title IX’s prohibition against sex discrimination to permit the operation of single-sex schools and programs.93 In its notice of
proposed rulemaking, the agency expressly tied the reform to the
President’s school choice initiative, which sought to expand the types
of educational opportunities available to students.94
In light of the robust legal and political constraints on rulemaking, one might ask why OCR would employ this policymaking tool at
all. Although other factors such as the availability of the binding
force of law and Chevron deference may have influenced the decision
to pursue this policymaking form, it is worth noting that in this instance, the agency had no choice but to engage in rulemaking
because it sought to reverse a prior regulation, which expressly

92. OCR amended or issued new regulations on two additional occasions over this
time period, but these instances were spurred not by the White House, but rather by congressional enactments. In 2000, OCR amended its regulations defining the term “program
or activity” to conform to the definition mandated by the Civil Rights Restoration Act. 65
Fed. Reg. 68,050, 68,050 (Nov. 13, 2000) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 100, 104, 106, 110
(2015)). Six years later, it promulgated new regulations to ensure equal access to public
school facilities in response to congressional enactment of the Boy Scouts of America Equal
Access Act in 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 69,456, 69,456 (Nov. 15, 2002) (codified at 34
C.F.R. §§ 108.1-.9 (2015)). Agencies have little choice but to engage in rulemaking under
these circumstances. See Strauss, supra note 64, at 1247 (“A new statute which requires
implementation does not present a choice between rulemaking and other forms of policy
formulation: rules are required, although they are not always speedily forthcoming.”).
93. 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530, 62,530 (Oct. 25, 2006) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2015)).
94. 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (Mar. 9, 2004).
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prohibited single-sex schools and programs.95 Had OCR been free to
employ another policymaking tool, it is not at all clear that it would
have chosen to engage in rulemaking.
2. Guidance Documents
OCR relies extensively on guidance documents to implement
White House goals. Typically appearing in the form of a “Dear Colleague Letter” (DCL) to recipients of federal funding,96 OCR has issued more than fifty guidance documents over the past twenty-five
years.97 For example, OCR implemented the Bush administration’s
commitment to religious freedom by issuing a DCL stating it would
use Title VI and Title IX, which address race- and sex-discrimination
respectively, to “aggressively prosecute harassment of religious students.”98 It promoted the Obama administration’s policy on racial equity by issuing DCLs announcing it would aggressively investigate
schools exhibiting racial disparities in rates of discipline99 and allocation of resources.100

95. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 4, 1975) (prohibiting single-sex classes with limited
exceptions for sex education, physical education, and similar classes); see Am. Mining
Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting agencies must undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking to amend or reverse prior regulations).
96. Other forms of policy guidance issued by OCR include “Guidance” documents and
“Policy Updates.” See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF
RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOLS (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese201111.pdf; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE:
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES
(2001), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf; Office for Civil Rights,
Policy Update on Schools’ Obligations Toward National Origin Minority Students with
Limited-English Proficiency, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 27, 1991), http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/lau1991.html.
97. OCR makes all policy guidance currently in effect available on its website. Office
for Civil Rights, Reading Room, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/frontpage/faq/readingroom.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
98. Kenneth Marcus, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights, Title VI
and Title IX Religious Discrimination in Schools and Colleges (Sept. 13, 2004),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/religious-rights2004.html. By way of example, it
cited a case in which a “white male undergraduate student was harassed by a professor for
expressing conservative Christian views” on homosexuality. Id.
99. CATHERINE E. LHAMON & JOCELYN SAMUELS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR
COLLEAGUE LETTER: NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (Jan. 8,
2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.pdf. The
DCL characterizes as unlawful discrimination any discipline policy that has an adverse
impact on students of a particular race unless the policy is “necessary to meet an important
educational goal” and no “comparably effective alternative policies or practices that would
meet the school’s stated educational goal with less of a burden or adverse impact.”
Id. at 11.
100. CATHERINE E. LHAMON, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER:
RESOURCE COMPARABILITY (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-resourcecomp-201410.pdf.
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Perhaps most striking, both the Bush and Obama administrations
used this policymaking tool to implement opposing positions on raceconscious diversity policies. OCR under the Bush administration issued policy guidance “strongly encourag[ing] the use of race-neutral
methods for assigning students to . . . schools.”101 Only three years
later, new leadership under the Obama administration withdrew
that guidance and replaced it with a series of DCLs expressly endorsing the use of race-conscious policies to promote diversity.102 These
examples demonstrate OCR’s reliance on guidance documents to further politicized policy priorities.
3. Exercises of Enforcement Discretion
An analysis of OCR exercises of enforcement discretion suggests
reliance on this tool to implement politicized policy initiatives as
well. Although the vast majority of OCR investigations are initiated
in response to an individual complaint filed with the agency,103 OCR
also proactively launches broad-scale, system-wide “compliance reviews,” designed to address “issues of strategic significance.”104 OCR
distinguishes compliance reviews from individual complaint investigations as follows: “Complaints often affect one or a small group of
students, whereas compliance reviews target issues of discrimination
that are acute, regional, national in scope, or are newly emerging.
They are designed to affect significant change at the target institution and provide widely applicable solutions.”105

101. STEPHANIE MONROE, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER:
ADDRESSING TITLE VI AND HOW OCR ASSESSES THE USE OF RACE IN ASSIGNING STUDENTS
TO ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Aug. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
102. The current administration issued guidance documents endorsing race-conscious
policies on no fewer than four occasions. RUSSLYNN ALI & THOMAS E. PEREZ, OFFICE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201111.pdf (discussing the issuance of guidance documents
by the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice regarding the
voluntary use of race in student assignment); JOCELYN SAMUELS, & CATHERINE E.
LHAMON, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS AT AUSTIN (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201309.pdf; CATHERINE E. LHAMON ET AL., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR
COLLEAGUE LETTER (May 6, 2014) (discussing Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action and its implications for institutions of higher education and elementary schools and
their use of methods to achieve diversity).
103. OCR investigates every individual complaint filed with it. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)-(c)
(2015). The number of individual complaints filed with OCR per year varies considerably,
ranging over the past ten years from a low of 5533 in 2005 to a high of 9989 in 2014.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16, at 8.
104. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009-12, supra note 16, at 4.
105. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET
REQUEST 11 (2015) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, BUDGET REQUEST],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget15/justifications/bb-ocr.pdf.

116

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:91

This analysis of OCR’s exercise of enforcement discretion relies on
data obtained pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for documents relating to OCR compliance reviews.106 For each
compliance review initiated by OCR, the FOIA response provided: a
docket number, the name of the educational entity targeted for investigation; dates on which the review was initiated, resolved, and
closed; a list of the specific issues investigated in the review; and a
description of how each of these issues was resolved.107 A comparison
of compliance reviews initiated and resolved during the eight years of
the Bill Clinton administration and the eight years of the George W.
Bush administration shows significant shifts in the exercise of enforcement discretion.
First, these administrations differed drastically in the overall
number of compliance reviews initiated, suggesting a difference in
the aggressiveness of their systemic reform efforts. Table 1 sets forth
these data. During the Clinton years, OCR initiated a total of 889
compliance reviews, or an average of 111 per year. The Bush administration, by contrast, initiated only 311 compliance reviews over
eight years, yielding an average of 39 per year. This difference cannot
be attributed to the complexity of reviews initiated. On the contrary,
each compliance review initiated during the Clinton administration
investigated on average 6.3 discrete issues, as compared to an average of only 3.4 issues per review in the subsequent administration.
Nor can the difference be attributed to changes in funding, as the average annual appropriation to OCR during the Bush administration
was more than forty percent greater than for the Clinton administration.108 The disparity may, however, be due to differences in how
the agency defines “compliance review.” OCR sometimes defines the
term to encompass any systemic investigation, including those that
106. The Freedom of Information Act request sought from the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights all “[d]ocuments relating to proactive compliance reviews, including resolution agreements, termination letters, and records of monitoring efforts from
FY 1990 to present.” Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Feb. 25,
2014) (on file with author).
107. Letter from Christie D. Swafford, United States Dep’t of Educ., Office of Mgmt.,
Privacy, Information, and Records Management Services, to author regarding FOIA Request No. 14-00765-F (July 14, 2014) (on file with author); Email from Robert M. Carey,
U.S. Dep’t of Ed., Office for Civil Rights, to author regarding FOIA Request 14-00765-F,
Excel Spreadsheet (Aug. 27, 2014) (on file with author).
108. The average annual appropriation to OCR under the Clinton administration was
$60 million, while the average annual appropriation under the W. Bush administration
was $86 million. The number of staff employed by OCR fell, however, from an annual average of 752 full-time equivalent employees during Clinton’s two terms to an annual average
of 658 full-time equivalent employees during Bush’s two terms. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2003, at 2 (listing OCR budget requests, appropriations, and
staffing levels from 1993 through 2003); OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY
2007-08, at 3 (listing OCR budget requests, appropriations, and staffing from 1997
to 2008).
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originally stemmed from an individual complaint.109 Other times,
OCR appears to use the term narrowly to refer to systemic investigations only if they did not originate with an individual complaint.110
More tellingly, the issues targeted in compliance reviews show
significant shifts in policy priorities. Eighty-six percent (86%) of the
compliance reviews initiated during the Clinton administration related to Title VI enforcement, investigating discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin, while only forty-five percent
(45%) of the compliance reviews initiated during the Bush administration involved Title VI enforcement. By contrast, the Bush administration initiated far more compliance reviews to enforce protections
against discrimination on the basis of disability than the preceding
administration. Forty-five percent (45%) of compliance reviews initiated under Bush investigated such issues, as compared to only eight
percent (8%) under Clinton.
Table 1
Compliance Reviews Initiated
Clinton
Bush
Administration
Administration
Total Number
889
311
Race
86% (767)
45% (140)
Sex
13% (120)
38% (118)
Disability
8% (69)
46% (141)
Note: A single compliance review may investigate multiple forms of
discrimination, such as race- as well as sex-discrimination. Consequently, the sum of reviews relating to race-, sex-, and disabilitydiscrimination exceeds the total number of compliance reviews.

Data disaggregated by regional office provide further evidence of
the politicization of enforcement discretion as set forth in Table 2.
Regional offices are staffed exclusively with career officers who enjoy
civil service protections. If individual enforcement decisions were not
susceptible to political interference, one might expect variance across
regional offices in light of the differing demographic makeup of each
region, but consistency within each regional office through time. Yet
the data, set forth in Table 2, indicate the precise opposite. Every
single regional office during the Clinton administration initiated at
109. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CASE PROCESSING MANUAL art. I, § 110(l), at 13
(2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrcpm.pdf (providing that an individual complaint may be treated as a compliance review where it involves systemic issues).
110. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16, at 44
(noting that resolution agreements addressing systemic issues result from both compliance
reviews and individual complaints).
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least one compliance review to enforce Title VI protections relating to
racial harassment, resource equity and comparability, or discipline,
and ten of the twelve offices investigated these issues in at least ten
distinct compliance reviews. The Bush administration, by contrast,
rarely investigated these issues. Three of the twelve regional offices
did not file a single compliance review involving these issues, and
only one office investigated these issues in more than two compliance
reviews.
Rather, regional offices during the Bush administration prioritized the enforcement of Title IX procedural requirements. Every
single regional office in this time period initiated at least one compliance review involving Title IX enforcement related to grievance procedures, the designation of a responsible employee, or the dissemination of a sex-discrimination policy; and ten of the twelve offices initiated five or more compliance reviews relating to such issues. During
the preceding eight years, by contrast, three offices failed to initiate a
single compliance review involving Title IX’s procedural requirements, and only two offices initiated more than two reviews investigating such issues. The differences in issues investigated through
time coupled with the consistency of issues across regional offices
suggest that they are not the result of decisions by career staff.
Table 2
Compliance Reviews Initiated by Regional Office
Title VI: Racial
Title IX: Grievance
harassment; Resource
procedures; Designation of
equity & comparability;
responsible employee;
Discipline
Dissemination of policy
Region
Clinton
Bush
Clinton
Bush
1
13
1
4
12
2
10
2
1
2
3
6
0
1
7
4
10
1
0
3
5
15
1
1
5
6
1
1
0
14
7
17
0
0
11
8
10
1
0
6
9
28
0
0
7
10
10
2
0
7
11
23
1
1
5
12
19
4
3
7
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Perhaps most revealing, the data suggest significant policy shifts
in the manner in which investigations are resolved. The vast majority of investigations are closed either because the agency determines
there is insufficient evidence to warrant proceeding further or because it negotiates a resolution agreement to remedy the issue of
concern.111 Because an administration is free to alter the legal and
factual standards to justify further action for particular types of
claims, high rates of insufficient evidence findings may reflect antipathy toward certain issues.112 Table 3 sets forth the data on the percentage of investigations that were closed due to insufficient evidence
during the Clinton and Bush administrations. Of the total 5699 issues investigated and resolved during the Clinton administration,
only thirteen percent (13%) were found to have insufficient evidence;
in the subsequent eight years, twenty-two percent (22%) of the 1128
issues resolved were closed due to a finding of insufficient evidence.
Table 3
Findings of Insufficient Evidence
Clinton
Bush
Administration
Administration
Enforcement investigations closed
13%
22%
due to insufficient evidence
Race investigations closed due to
11%
25%
insufficient evidence
Sex investigations closed due to in27%
16%
sufficient evidence
Disabilities investigations closed
12%
27%
due to insufficient
evidence

These disparities become starker when the data are disaggregated
by type of case. During the Bush administration, twenty-five percent
(25%) of resolved Title VI investigations were closed because of a
finding of insufficient evidence, more than twice the rate of such closures (11%) during the Clinton administration. Resolutions of disability-discrimination investigations reflect a similar pattern, with the
Bush administration finding insufficient evidence in twenty-seven
111. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CASE PROCESSING MANUAL art. III, § 303(a),
at 21, § 304, at 22 (2015). OCR occasionally closes a compliance review on other grounds,
such as when it refers the case to another agency or because private litigation is pending.
Id. § 110(m), at 13.
112. A finding of insufficient evidence in any compliance review is noteworthy, as these
reviews are initiated at the discretion of the agency, which presumably screens out meritless cases. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OCR CASE PROCESSING MANUAL, art. III, § 303, at 21
(2015) (reviewing the consequences of an insufficient evidence determination).
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percent (27%) of these cases, as compared to only twelve percent
(12%) during the Clinton administration. The resolution of investigations to enforce sex-discrimination protections exhibit the opposite
trend: the Clinton administration closed more than a quarter of its
Title IX investigations because of insufficient evidence, as compared
to only sixteen percent (16%) during the subsequent administration.
Contrary to suggestions that individual enforcement decisions are too
far removed from an agency’s political leadership to be subject to
presidential control,113 these data indicate significant shifts in the
initiation and resolution of compliance reviews.114
C. The Operation of Constraints on OCR Policymaking
The evidence of OCR policymaking supports the contention that
agencies implement contentious policy initiatives through guidance
documents to evade the more onerous constraints imposed on rulemaking. More alarmingly, however, it also shows that agencies circumvent even the modest checks on guidance documents by channeling policy initiatives through the strategic exercise of enforcement
discretion.
Although OCR guidance documents have avoided the extensive
constraints imposed on rulemaking, this policymaking tool nonetheless has remained subject to some degree of oversight. While courts
have declined to exercise legal checks on OCR guidance documents,115
OCR’s practice of publicly disclosing guidance documents has enabled
both Congress and the public at large to exercise political constraints.
For example, when OCR issued a guidance document interpreting
Title VI to permit colleges and universities to grant minority scholarships,116 Congress mobilized pressure on the agency by requesting
that the General Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a review of the
policy; this political pressure ultimately resulted in the agency agreeing to “defer” its policy decision.117 Similarly, the public has played a
role in disciplining policies announced through OCR guidance docu113. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 435 (arguing that the threat of “hidden law”
is overstated).
114. Political scientists have documented similar shifts in other agency enforcement
contexts following changes in political leadership. B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN,
BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 73 (1994).
115. See, e.g., Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 944-45
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting on standing grounds challenge to OCR guidance document announcing new standard for Title IX compliance in university athletic programs); Wash.
Legal Found. v. Alexander, 984 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying judicial review pursuant
to Administrative Procedure Act over challenge to OCR guidance document announcing
policy on minority scholarships).
116. OCR’s shifting policies with respect to minority scholarships are described in
Washington Legal Foundation, 984 F.2d at 485.
117. Id.
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ments. Public criticism of the Obama administration’s guidance document announcing a new standard universities should use in investigating allegations of sexual violence, which appeared in mainstream
news outlets including the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post,
and the Atlantic Monthly, has imposed a heavy political cost on this
policy decision.118 In these ways, OCR’s pursuit of presidential policy
goals through the issuance of guidance documents has been subject to
some degree of political oversight.
OCR has succeeded in avoiding these modest checks, however, by
implementing policy goals through the exercise of enforcement discretion. Courts have exercised no legal checks on OCR’s use of this
policymaking tool. OCR enforcement proceedings do not usually result in settlement, but rather they always do. In the period for which
data were available, OCR issued a letter of impending enforcement
action in a compliance review on only two occasions and, in both cases, reached a voluntary resolution before initiating formal agency adjudication. Consequently, there has not been a single instance over
the past quarter century in which an enforcement decision resulted
in the final agency action necessary for judicial review.119
Additionally, Congress has played a minimal role in disciplining
OCR’s enforcement decisions, convening only four oversight hearings
to evaluate OCR enforcement efforts since 1990. Of these, only the
first raised a concern about under-enforcement.120 The second hearing
related to OCR’s handling of a single complaint of sexual harassment,121 while the last two examined concerns regarding
over-enforcement.122
118. See, e.g., Peter Berkowitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of
Male
Guilt,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
20,
2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424053111903596904576516232905230642; Opinion, The Feds’ Mad Assault on
Campus Sex, N.Y. POST (July 20, 2011), http://nypost.com/2011/07/20/the-feds-mad-assaulton-campus-sex/; Wendy Kaminer, The Save Act: Trading Liberty for Security on Campus,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/04/thesave-act-trading-liberty-for-security-on-campus/237833/; Letter from Gregory F. Sholtz,
Assoc. Sec’y & Dir., Dep’t of Acad. Freedom, Tenure, & Governance, to Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office of Civil Rights, (June 27, 2011), http://www.nacua.org/
documents/AAUPLetterToOCRReSexualViolenceEvidence.pdf (responding to the Dear
Colleague Letter dated Apr. 4, 2011).
119. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
120. Oversight Hearing: Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education Before the S.
Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 102d Cong. 3-4 (1991) (addressing concerns of OCR’s under-enforcement of Title VI with respect to ability grouping).
121. Oversight Hearing on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Before the
Subcomm. on Select Educ. & Civil Rights of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 103d Cong.
136-42, 162-64 (1994) (discussing OCR investigation of a single allegation of sexual harassment at Moorhead State University).
122. Hearing on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Educ., Training & Life-Long Learning of the H. Comm. on Econ. & Educ.
Opportunities, 104th Cong. 26 (1995) (assessing whether over-enforcement of sex discrimination in college athletics was “tearing down men’s sports”); see The Review and Oversight

122

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:91

Finally, the limited disclosure of OCR enforcement decisions has
precluded the public’s ability to exercise meaningful checks on them.
Pursuant to congressional requirements, OCR periodically issues reports summarizing its compliance and enforcement activities.123 Although not statutorily required to provide any particular level of specificity, these reports do disclose information including the total number of compliance reviews initiated each year and some of the major
issues targeted in such reviews. Yet, because this information is neither exhaustive nor statutorily mandated, it is conceivable that enforcement decisions vulnerable to public reprisal are excised from
these reports. Moreover, these reports omit any indication of issues
that were not pursued, either because they were closed due to insufficient evidence or because they were not initiated in the first instance.124 These information gaps limit the public’s ability to hold the
agency accountable for shifts in enforcement policy.
Of course, further specificity may be disclosed in the manner in
which the data for this study were obtained—a Freedom of Information Act request. Even this mechanism is limited, however, as it
fails to provide crucial details regarding the conduct of investigations, the level of evidence necessary to proceed with an investigation, or the content and ongoing monitoring of resolution agreements
reached. As a result, the agency is free to institute only cosmetic interventions such as the posting of anti-discrimination policies rather
than more extensive remedial measures, all without public scrutiny.125
Importantly, the current administration has taken steps to improve the transparency of enforcement decisions. OCR now publishes
a list of institutions under investigation and has made publicly available all resolution agreements entered since 2014.126 While OCR
of the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 106th Cong.
(1999) (addressing concerns about over-enforcement, particularly on the areas of athletics,
English language learners, and standardized testing).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 3413(b)(1) (2012). Notably, although OCR is statutorily required to
make these reports annually, it has issued only three reports over the past seven years. See
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
FISCAL YEARS 2007-08 (2009) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY
2007-08], http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/ocr/annrpt2007-08/annrpt2007-08.pdf;
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009-12, supra note 16; OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16.
124. See, e.g., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2007-08, supra note 123;
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009-12, supra note 17; OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16.
125. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (endorsing model of “experimentalist
regulation” in favor of traditional command-and-control remedies to restructure public
institutions).
126. Office for Civil Rights, Recent Resolutions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/index.html?exp=2 (last visited
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should be applauded for these efforts, the lack of a mechanism for
enforcement and the possibility of future rescission limit the usefulness of such self-imposed constraints.
The evidence suggests not only that OCR has exercised its enforcement discretion in furtherance of partisan policy goals, but also
that in doing so, it has avoided even the modest constraints associated with guidance documents.
D. Generalizing from OCR’s Choice of Policymaking Form
OCR’s policymaking record suggests that competing practical and
doctrinal considerations fail to counterbalance the agency’s incentives to employ particular policymaking forms to minimize constraints
on executive discretion. Several factors likely account for this dynamic, providing important clues as to the generalizability of these
findings.
First, the OCR case study suggests that an agency’s political leadership is both willing and able to exercise control over individual enforcement decisions. That is, exercises of enforcement discretion are
not immune from political influence, even absent a guidance document directing the conduct of lower-level enforcement officers. Importantly, however, the case study focuses on compliance reviews,
which are sufficiently limited in number to allow political operatives
to exercise review over each and every decision. Enforcement decisions over individual complaints, which number in the thousands
annually, may be less susceptible to presidential control. Yet the lack
of information regarding individual complaint investigations leaves
open the possibility that these decisions are subject to political influence as well. In any case, even without control over more individual
complaints, which tend to be of limited practical impact, the ability to
influence systemic investigations provides a powerful tool to achieve
presidential policy goals without legal or political accountability.
Second, the evidence suggests that the binding force of law does
not suffice to counteract the incentives to circumvent the rigorous
checks on rulemaking. Three factors likely allow OCR to rely on nonformalized policymaking tools notwithstanding their lack of binding
effect: the nature of the entities regulated, the normative weight of
the agency’s enforcement mission, and the types of sanctions available to the agency.

Feb. 27, 2016); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note
16, at 5 (“To boost transparency, OCR instituted a new policy of publicizing lists of schools
under investigation by OCR, including a list of colleges subject to pending sexual violence
cases, and of uploading nearly every resolution agreement and letter reached during FY
2014 and beyond onto its website.”).
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The entities regulated by OCR are unlikely to resist even nonbinding OCR policy. The costs of compliance for public K-12 schools
in particular are low. Overseen by popularly elected school boards
and their delegates, their compliance decisions ultimately are political decisions, and the ability to deflect responsibility onto the federal
government reduces the political liability that might otherwise be
imposed on a decision to comply. In addition, entities regulated by
OCR are not driven by profit; while a business entity is likely to challenge an enforcement decision when the costs of compliance outweigh
the risk of losing the challenge, the nonprofit and government institutions regulated by OCR do not face such financial incentives.
Moreover, civil rights agencies like OCR arguably carry more
normative sway than other regulatory agencies, increasing the likelihood of voluntary compliance with its policies. Regulated entities
may be particularly averse to media attention that could result from
visible resistance to a federal civil rights agency. Agencies that regulate in more technical fields or those that regulate entities that do
not depend on end-use consumers may face more resistance to policy
impositions.
The nature of the sanctions available to OCR may also encourage
regulated entities to comply with non-binding policy decisions. The
potential sanctions for non-compliance of OCR policies are entirely
binary; the agency either grants or denies all federal funding. The
risk of a total loss of federal financial support, even if remote, creates
powerful incentives to comply. Regulated entities facing the risk of
more calibrated sanctions, by contrast, may have less to lose in challenging an agency’s decision.
These factors eliminate any real cost to OCR’s circumvention of
checks on presidential power by relying on non-formalized policymaking tools. Even without the binding force of law, OCR’s exercises of
enforcement discretion and guidance documents produce significant
regulatory effects on the ground. Although not all agencies will enjoy
this luxury, those that share these characteristics with OCR have
few incentives to expose themselves to the rigorous external checks
of rulemaking.
***
The absence of meaningful checks on OCR’s exercise of enforcement discretion raises considerable normative concerns. First, it enables the President to direct agency enforcement in contravention of
congressional intent or in abdication of statutory duties. Second, it
permits policies to be developed without careful deliberation or public
input. Third, the absence of transparency allows OCR to impose policies without political opposition. Finally, naked partisan preferences
may override the neutral judgment and expertise of career enforce-

2015]

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL

125

ment officers. These normative concerns necessitate reforms to
strengthen checks on agency exercises of enforcement discretion in
pursuit of presidential policies. The next Part explores the potential
for such reforms.
IV. STRENGTHENING CHECKS ON ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
This Part explores potential reforms to temper presidentially motivated enforcement decisions. It begins by evaluating strategies to
strengthen the role of external institutions to constrain agency enforcement discretion. Concluding that such reforms would be insufficient, it turns to the possibilities for enhancing internal constraints.
Focusing on structures and processes within the agency itself, it proposes harnessing the civil service bureaucracy and its relationships
with external institutions to discipline presidential power.
A. Legal Constraints
One strategy to constrain politicized enforcement decisions would
be to strengthen legal checks on them. Such a reform might proceed
in one of two ways. First, courts could doctrinally restrict the agency’s ability to promulgate policies through enforcement proceedings
rather than through alternative policymaking tools. Alternatively,
they might exercise substantive review over enforcement decisions.
Neither avenue is likely to find favor, however, and for good reason.
The first strategy would weaken doctrinal protection over the
agency’s choice of policymaking tool. A number of commentators have
endorsed this approach to limit an agency’s ability to choose between
rulemaking and guidance documents. Professor Bressman, for example, would require agencies to provide a reasoned explanation for a
decision to implement a policy through a guidance document in lieu
of rulemaking, while Professor Watts argues for a clearer doctrinal
distinction between policies that may be implemented through guidance documents and those that must undergo rulemaking.127 The case
study suggests, however, that such reforms would be counterproductive, simply channeling more decisions from guidance documents,
which are subject to modest constraints, to enforcement discretion,
which is subject to no meaningful oversight.
To avoid this result, this strategy would need to restrict an agency’s ability to promote new policies through the exercise of enforcement discretion. Few, however, seriously advocate reversing Chenery
127. See Bressman, supra note 2, at 553 (endorsing requirement that agencies provide
reasoned explanation for decision to implement policy through policy guidance rather than
rulemaking); Watts, supra note 1, at 78 (urging development of clearer doctrinal distinction
between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules to limit agencies’ ability to impose new
policies through policy guidance rather than through rulemaking).
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II to restrict an agency’s ability to impose new policies through exercises of enforcement discretion rather than either rulemaking or policy guidance. The reason is clear: any effort to distinguish when a given enforcement decision imposes new policy is destined to fail. As
Professor Strauss notes, “Even with the most comprehensive ‘legislative’ scheme, judicial application inevitably ‘makes’ new law.”128 Consequently, “[t]he search for mandatory controls over the allocation of
the policymaking function between rulemaking and adjudication
remains illusory.”129
Rather than restrict the agency’s choice of policymaking form, the
second strategy would allow substantive judicial review over the enforcement decisions themselves. Reforms to ripeness and finality doctrines would enable courts to review an enforcement decision before
an adjudicatory finding of noncompliance is entered.130 But even if
doctrinal reforms made judicial review available, the targets of enforcement proceedings would be unlikely to take advantage of it.
Regulated entities that are likely to voluntarily comply with OCR’s
non-binding policy preferences are equally unlikely to legally challenge those preferences.131 The ability to shift political blame for
compliance, lack of a profit motive, aversion to negative media attention, and risk of losing all federal funding make it exceedingly unlikely that the target of a compliance review would file suit against OCR
rather than comply with its requests.
Others have argued for abandoning the Heckler doctrine to allow
judicial review over non-enforcement decisions.132 This reform would
empower regulatory beneficiaries to legally challenge enforcement
decisions. Like most agencies, however, OCR lacks the resources to
investigate every potential violation of law and must engage in a
“complicated balancing . . . of factors” to allocate these scarce resources.133 Courts do not have the institutional competence, lacking
both political accountability as well as bureaucratic expertise, to determine whether X percent of OCR enforcement efforts should be de128. See Strauss, supra note 64, at 1265; see also Andrias, supra note 14, at 1101
(“[T]he line between individual enforcement actions and enforcement policy is not always
so clear . . . .”).
129. See Strauss, supra note 64, at 1274.
130. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 384-85 (endorsing reforms to ripeness and finality
doctrines to strengthen judicial review over policy guidance).
131. See supra Section III.D (discussing such factors).
132. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 461-62 (2008); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1657, 1667-68 (2004); Cheh, supra note 53, at 279-88; Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing
Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675 (1985) (endorsing
narrow reading of Heckler to allow judicial review over agency decisions not to enforce).
133. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); see also Price, supra note 14, at 748;
Sunstein, supra note 132, at 682.
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voted to race discrimination claims, for example, while Y percent
should be devoted to disability claims. Additionally, as Jeffrey Love
and Arpit Garg point out, an agency can always defend its failure to
investigate by claiming simply that it has not done so yet.134 For these
reasons, proposals to strengthen legal constraints to exercises of
agency enforcement discretion are neither practicable nor advisable.
B. Political Constraints
Rather than relying on legal constraints to discipline agencies’ exercise of enforcement discretion, another reform strategy might focus
on political constraints. Congress could enhance its own ability and
that of the public to discipline enforcement decisions by narrowing
the scope of the agency’s discretion135 or by requiring more transparency in the agency’s exercise of this discretion.136
To discipline presidential control over agency enforcement decisions, Congress might statutorily restrict the scope of an agency’s
enforcement discretion by, for example, earmarking funds for particular enforcement activities. This approach would need to overcome
the veto-gates of the legislative process,137 which may be particularly
difficult for agencies like OCR, whose constituencies include diffuse
regulatory beneficiaries lacking deep pockets. More importantly, even
if legislative reforms in this area were achievable, they may not result in better policies. Legislative specificity denies agencies the flexibility to respond to new challenges in a changing environment. It
also may undermine the judgment of career enforcement officials,
who accumulate expertise in identifying forms of discrimination most
damaging to educational achievement and the types of remedies most
effective in combating discrimination in schools.138
Instead of narrowing the scope of OCR’s enforcement discretion,
Congress could strengthen political checks by requiring more trans134. Love & Garg, supra note 14, at 1228.
135. See id. at 1245 (endorsing such reform).
136. See Andrias, supra note 14, at 1036 (advocating increased transparency of enforcement policy).
137. Cf. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2339 (noting that the President can achieve policy
goals effectively “without the indecision and inefficiency that so often characterize the behavior of collective entities” such as congressional committees). Legislative inertia is particularly likely during periods of united government, as Congress has few incentives to
restrict the policies of a President of its own party. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2338 (2006).
138. Congress’s attempt to limit OCR’s enforcement discretion in 1990 provides a cautionary tale. That year, a Senate committee proposed earmarking $250,000 of OCR’s budget for compliance reviews targeting admissions programs in post-secondary institutions. S.
REP. NO. 101-516, at 293 (1990). It is not clear, however, that this proposal would have
improved OCR enforcement. There was no evidence that university admissions presented a
particularly pressing civil rights concern at the time or that agency officials would have
initiated more such reviews if they had the additional funding.
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parency.139 As described above, OCR has taken important steps toward this goal by making publicly available a list of all institutions it
is investigating and all resolution agreements it has reached since
2014.140 Congress should applaud this effort and require future administrations to maintain this policy. Additionally, it should require
more detailed data to be included in OCR’s annual reports, including
the steps taken to investigate cases, the number and types of cases
closed due to insufficient evidence, the legal and factual standards
used to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed
with further action, and the steps taken to monitor resolution agreements after they are entered. These data would enable Congress and
the public at large to identify shifts in enforcement policy and hold
the administration accountable for them.
While political checks in the form of transparency requirements
are important, they fail to address all of the concerns raised by exercises of enforcement discretion.141 Exclusive reliance on public pressure to discipline civil rights enforcement is particularly inapt given
that the regulatory regime in this area was created precisely to protect minority interests from majoritarian will.142 Additional mechanisms are necessary to ensure that public preferences do not undermine other regulatory norms of fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency.143 For such mechanisms, we must shift our attention to the internal workings of the agency.
C. Structural Reforms
The limitations to legal and political approaches to disciplining politicized enforcement decisions counsel for a turn inward, to explore
the relationship between structures and processes of the agency on
the one hand, and effective enforcement on the other.144 The Adminis-

139. Andrias, supra note 14, at 1103 (contending that public disclosure of enforcement
policy decisions clarifies “lines of command and makes the exercise of power more visible,
thereby allowing for easier public evaluation”); see also Love & Garg, supra note 14, at
1245 (recommending enhanced transparency to strengthen political accountability of executive decision-making).
140. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
141. See Bressman, supra note 2, at 496; see also Criddle, supra note 2, at 466 (arguing
that agency regulators, acting as fiduciaries, must promote the public welfare rather than
the public will).
142. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
143. Strauss, supra note 8, at 1354 (“The very circumstances that so often effectively
require intransitivity in legislation carry with them the implication that political will alone
cannot suffice to validate regulations, that acts of reasoned judgment along legislatively
prescribed lines are required.”).
144. See sources cited supra note 18.
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trative Conference of the United States (ACUS) describes the importance of these aspects of agency design as follows:
[T]he structures of federal agencies, from their location to features of their internal design and reporting requirements, partly
determine who has influence over non-statutory policy decisions
and how well federal agencies perform in carrying out statutorily
mandated responsibilities. . . . Agency structure determines who
gets to make decisions and how well those decisions will be implemented. It determines whether agencies will be responsive to the
White House, Congress, or key groups and who has access to
decisionmakers.145

At least three distinct proposals suggest themselves: changing the
leadership structure of OCR; encouraging inter-agency competition;
and amending procedures for initiating, investigating, and resolving
compliance reviews. It concludes that while the first two proposals
are likely to be of limited effectiveness, the third approach offers a
powerful check on politicized enforcement decisions.
The first structural approach to disciplining presidential control
over enforcement decisions focuses on agency leadership. Currently,
OCR leadership is vested in a single presidential appointee, who enjoys no protections from removal. An alternative leadership structure
arguably would be less likely to bend to the President’s policy preferences. Yet the records of two other civil rights agencies suggest that
attempts to insulate agency leadership from presidential pressure by
altering the structure of leadership may be ineffective or even
counterproductive.
By statute, leadership over the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)—responsible for investigating and resolving allegations of employment discrimination—is vested in a five-member
bipartisan body. No more than three Commissioners may be members of the same political party, and each member’s five-year term
protects him or her from politically motivated removal.146 Yet, EEOC
enforcement decisions have remained subject to considerable presidential influence despite this leadership structure. Margaret Lemos’
empirical study of the EEOC finds that although partisan influence
over the agency’s policy guidance has been limited, its enforcement
decisions have been subject to considerable political control. In particular, she notes that once the majority of Commissioners were Republican, the Reagan administration succeeded in shifting EEOC enforcement policy away from more subtle and systemic forms of discrimination to focus instead on individual complaints of intentional

145. LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 29, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012).
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discrimination.147 This record suggests that a bipartisan committee
structure may not be particularly effective in protecting enforcement
decisions from presidential influence.
The enforcement record of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
(USCCR)—charged with monitoring federal enforcement of civil
rights laws—suggests that a leadership structure designed to be insulated from presidential influence may not only be ineffective, but
indeed may counterproductively result in systematic nonenforcement. Like the EEOC, the USCCR is led by a multi-member
commission, where each Commissioner is protected from politicized
removal.148 Unlike the EEOC, however, the USCCR consists of eight
Commissioners, no more than four of whom may be members of the
same political party.149 While this structure may safeguard the
USCCR from presidential influence, it also has resulted in policy paralysis due to partisan gridlock. For example, when USCCR career
staff drafted a report critiquing civil rights enforcement during the
Bush administration,150 Commissioners voted along party lines to bar
its publication.151 Similar problems of partisan gridlock have plagued
the Commission for decades, undermining the agency’s continued
credibility and relevance.152 In this case, the attempt to insulate
agency leadership from presidential control has resulted in less enforcement altogether.
A second structural strategy to discipline presidential influence
over enforcement decisions would grant overlapping jurisdiction to
multiple agencies to generate inter-agency conflict and competition.
Professor Neal Katyal argues: “Just as the standard separation-ofpowers paradigms (legislature v. courts, executive v. courts, legislature v. executive) overlap to produce friction, so too do their internal
variants. When the State and Defense Departments have to convince
each other of why their view is right, for example, better decisionmaking results.”153 Again, however, the existing records suggest the
weakness of this strategy: OCR already shares overlapping jurisdiction with two competing agencies, yet neither has imposed a meaningful check on OCR enforcement decisions.
147. Lemos, supra note 66, at 416.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1975(a). The President may remove a member only for “neglect of duty
or malfeasance in office,” not on ideological grounds. Id. § 1975(e).
149. Id. § 1975(b).
150. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REDEFINING RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
RECORD OF THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 2001-2004 (Draft Report Sept. 2004),
http://health-equity.pitt.edu/57/.
151. For an account of the politics relating to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, see
Le, supra note 86, at 754-57.
152. See id. at 743-47.
153. Katyal, supra note 18, at 2317.
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OCR shares jurisdiction over the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in educational institutions with the Department
of Justice’s Civil Rights Division. Theoretically, the risk that the Civil Rights Division will initiate an enforcement proceeding against an
entity after OCR declines to do so tempers OCR’s exercise of enforcement discretion. A series of reports documenting politicized decision-making within the Civil Rights Division, however, suggests this
agency is at least as vulnerable to partisan manipulation as OCR.154
This finding should come as no surprise: like OCR, the Civil Rights
Division is led by a single presidential appointee with no protections
from removal. As such, its enforcement decisions are subject to the
same political pressures as OCR.155
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights also theoretically disciplines
OCR enforcement decisions.156 The fear of public criticism by USCCR
arguably deters OCR from straying too far from its mission. Yet, as
suggested above, partisan gridlock has precluded USCCR from imposing a meaningful check on sister agencies. The refusal to publish
the report criticizing civil rights enforcement under the Bush administration exemplifies this impotence.157 Neither the Civil Rights Division nor the USCCR appears to have played a meaningful role in disciplining OCR enforcement decisions.
A third structural strategy, focusing on the civil service bureaucracy and its relationships with external actors, holds more promise.158 One approach to insulating enforcement decisions from politicization would be to shift the authority to make these decisions to career enforcement officers. Yet this approach raises its own problems—compromising rule of law norms of uniformity and consistency
while at the same time precluding any form of public accountability.
Instead, OCR procedures should be amended to require the civil service attorneys and investigators within the agency to develop and
make publicly available written recommendations for each decision
relating to the initiation, investigation, resolution, and monitoring of
compliance reviews, while allowing the agency’s political leadership
154. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED
HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION (2008),
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INFORMATION ON EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, HOUSING & CIVIL ENFORCEMENT, VOTING, AND
SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTIONS’ ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FROM FISCAL YEARS 2001 THROUGH
2007 (2009).
155. Professor Katyal concedes, “[A] strong President can stymie two agencies almost
as easily as he can stymie one.” Katyal, supra note 18, at 2326.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(c)(1) (2012).
157. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158. See Metzger, Interdependent Relationship, supra note 18, at 442 (observing that
internal and external constraints mutually reinforce each other, and harnessing this relationship may provide the most effective method to disciplining presidential policies).
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to reject those recommendations. The bureaucratic recommendations
would provide crucial information to allow Congress and the public to
assess the administration’s policy choices, thereby empowering the
civil service while at the same time strengthening its relationship
with external institutions of constraint. It would also provide valuable information to courts—in the rare event that a challenge were
litigated—and might result in reduced judicial deference to administrative decisions departing from professional recommendation. Moreover, this mechanism is unlikely to impose meaningful drag on policymaking because career officials likely develop written recommendations already but simply do not make them publicly available.
In fact, this very mechanism led to public scrutiny over the Bush
Administration’s approval of pre-clearance submissions under the
Voting Rights Act. As Goodwin Liu documents, DOJ maintains an
institutional tradition in which career staff, who investigate preclearance submissions, provide a written memorandum to the political leadership with their recommendation; the political leadership
then is free to accept or reject the recommendation.159 News organizations obtained copies of these memoranda pursuant to a Freedom of
Information Act request. These documents revealed the leadership’s
rejection of staff recommendations, generating significant public criticism of politicized enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.160 Effective
constraints on politicized enforcement decisions are too important to
leave to institutional tradition within a single agency. Rather, this
practice should be mandated across agencies and enforced externally.
Congress could require staff to develop written recommendations and
publicly disclose them either through a straightforward mandate or
conditional funding. Courts might encourage the development and
disclosure of staff recommendations by calibrating the deference to
which they afford such decisions.
Additionally, OCR procedures should be amended to formally require career staff to confer with regulatory beneficiaries. Current
procedures for the conduct of compliance reviews contemplate constant interaction between the agency and the regulated entity, but no
role at all for regulatory beneficiaries.161 To ensure that enforcement
159. Liu, supra note 90, at 82-83.
160. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 480 (2006) (“Notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of the staff attorneys in the Voting Section of the
Justice Department . . . the Attorney General elected to pre-clear the map, thus allowing it
to take effect.”) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Regulatory beneficiaries play a minimal role even in the context of individual
complaint investigations where they are the complainant. Although OCR must keep the
complainant informed throughout the process, there is no requirement that the complainant participate in the negotiation of the resolution agreement or ongoing monitoring, for
example. See OCR Case Processing Manual, supra note 109, art. I, § 103, at 7; id. art. I,
§ 103, at 11; id. art. III, § 302, at 20.
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decisions benefit from the input of not only regulated entities but also
regulatory beneficiaries, the compliance review process should provide an explicit role for them. At the outset of each compliance review, OCR should be required to identify the intended beneficiaries
and convene a group to represent those beneficiaries. It should require periodic consultation with this group during the course of investigation and participation of the group in negotiating any resolution agreement. The beneficiary group should also play a role in subsequent monitoring of compliance with the resolution agreement.
These reforms will not only empower regulatory beneficiaries, but
also empower career staff, providing them with allies to resist political pressures in individual cases.
Whatever the precise course of reform, the ultimate goal of providing some check to presidential control over enforcement decisions
warrants more examination and study. While presidential control
may have salutary benefits to the development of agency policy, the
expertise of career staff and public accountability need not be sacrificed to achieve these benefits.162
V. CONCLUSION
The rise in presidential administration raises a host of thorny
questions regarding the appropriate role for the President, Congress,
and the courts in the modern administrative state. Even the most
ardent champions of presidential control agree that such control
must be subject to a system of checks and balances. Notwithstanding
this consensus, the OCR case study suggests that presidential policy
preferences may be implemented through agencies’ strategic exercise
of enforcement discretion with virtually no external oversight at all.
The absence of any constraint on administrative enforcement discretion renders this tool a particularly attractive means for achieving
objectives for which the administration may not want to be held legally or politically accountable.
Ultimately, any final assessment of constraints on executive authority requires a normative theory of the presidency and the extent
to which agency policy should be shaped by legal norms, political will,
or bureaucratic expertise. Important tradeoffs inhere in this decision,
and the calculus likely differs across regulatory contexts. The types of
constraints appropriate for the enforcement of political minorities’
rights may differ from those that should apply in more technical
or scientific contexts. Nonetheless, although reasonable minds will

162. See Watts, supra note 1 (arguing that reforms should preserve positive effects of
presidential control while mitigating negative ones).
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differ in assessing the extent to which administrative policies should
be constrained by legal, political, or structural mechanisms, resolution of the debate is impossible without a concrete understanding of
the manner in which these constraints actually operate in the real
world.

